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Abstract: 
Nazism got to power with the stated goal of destroying the economic livelihood of 
Germany’s Jewish population. For the most part, dispossession of Germany’s Jews 
was a highly bureaucratic process. This paper identifies the main fiscal 
instruments used in this process and assesses the quantitative impact. The 
principal finding is that the fiscal booty from the dispossession of Germany’s Jews 
was small: the Jewish share of Germany’s real wealth matched the Jewish 
population share quite well. I also find that together with prohibitive bureaucratic 
obstacles, punitive taxes on emigrants provided a substantial disincentive to 
emigrate and often rendered emigration outright impossible. This incentive was 
only mitigated when confiscatory capital levies were imposed also on the resident 
Jewish population in 1938. Nevertheless the spoils from Jewish dispossession 
were nowhere nearly large enough to warrant an economic interpretation of the 
Holocaust as in (Aly, 2007). Germany’s Jews were on the whole better trained than 
the average German but not necessarily much richer. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Nazism got to power in Germany in 1933 with the explicit goal of destroying the 
economic livelihood of Germany’s Jewish population, one of the few economic 
objectives on which it was clear. Dispossession of Germany’s Jewish population 
ranged from private robbery and pogroms to state-sponsored theft. Hence, any 
direct estimation of the sums involved will inevitably remain difficult and 
imprecise. For the most part, however, dispossession of Germany’s Jews was a 
highly bureaucratic process, as emphasized by Feldman (2003). A number of 
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studies have shed light on the bureaucratic practices and the internal conflicts 
within Germany’s tax administration at the time, see e.g. Bajohr (2001), Meinl 
and Zwilling (2004), Drecoll (2011), Kuller (2013). On the role of the Economics 
Ministry in this process see now Loose (2016). The present, short, paper is about 
identifying the main fiscal instruments used in this process and assessing the 
quantitative impact.  
 
The quantitative fallout can be ascertained from tax statistics, from internal 
estimates produced by Germany’s Statistical Office at the time, and from a report 
by a statistics task force of former German finance ministry officials put together 
for the Allied occupation authorities in 1947.1 Seminal work of Junz (2002) has 
made use of the tax data, enhanced by detailed archival evidence from Austrian 
archives. The internal estimates by the Statistical Office and the statistics task 
force report have been used in recent work by Fremdling (2016), which is, in a 
sense, parallel to the present paper. That report surveyed the decrees against 
Germany’s Jews issued in the 1930s, briefly described the Association of German 
Jews (Reichsvereinigung der deutschen Juden), an institution created in the 
process ostensibly to promote Jewish emigration, and gave an overview of the 
financial impact as reflected in the Reich’s central government accounts.  
 
The purpose of the present paper is to evaluate these figures against the existing 
estimates. My principal quantitative finding is that the fiscal booty from the 
dispossession of Germany’s Jews, though considerable as emphasised by 
Fremdling (2016), may have been overstated: over a range of estimates presented 
in this paper, the Jewish share of Germany’s real wealth matched the Jewish 
population quite well. The paper also calculates effective tax rates on German 
Jewish migrants. Together with prohibitive bureaucratic obstacles, these punitive 
taxes provided a substantial disincentive to emigrate and often rendered 
emigration outright impossible. This disincentive was only mitigated in late 1938 
when confiscatory taxation was imposed also on the resident Jewish population, 
contributing to a substantial spike in Jewish flight from Germany. The principal 
                                                          
1 German Federal Archives R2 Anh. 81/4. 
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qualitative result of this paper is that the spoils from Jewish dispossession were 
nowhere nearly large enough to warrant an economic interpretation of the 
Holocaust as in Aly (2007). Germany’s Jews were on the whole better educated 
than the average German but not necessarily much richer.  
 
This brief paper is structured as follows. Section II looks at the institutional setup 
of the state institutions involved and describes the chronology of financial 
destruction. Section III gives a quantitative assessment. Section IV calculates 
estimates of aggregate Jewish wealth and calculates these into data on aggregate 
wealth and real capital stock. Section V concludes. 
 
 
II Fiscal destruction: from institutional matrix to linear transmission 
The policy of fiscal destruction of Germany’s Jewish population came in several 
waves, was carried out by changing sets of institutions, and had been fully rolled 
out by early 1939. Regional differences in application and practice existed, as did 
rivalries and competition among government agencies. Policies were channelled 
through various different organisations in parallel, initially generating more of an 
institutional matrix of financial destruction than a direct, linear transmission 
mechanism. Fiscal instruments during the first phase until early 1938 centred on 
the taxation of emigration and an increasingly strict denial of transfers of 
remaining assets abroad. From 1938 on, confiscatory taxation was extended to the 
resident Jewish population, aiming to destroy economic livelihoods. This included 
bans on professional activity, bans on business, forced sales and confiscation of 
private property, and finally, confiscation of charity property. The registration and 
confiscation of Jewish assets left traces in government statistics, which lend 
themselves to quantification.  
 
a) Confiscatory Foreign Exchange Control  
The main fiscal tools facilitating the expropriation of German Jews up until 1938 
date back to before the beginning of Nazi rule. After the German financial crisis 
of mid-1931, capital controls had been introduced to stem capital flight. A foreign 
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exchange monopoly was established and placed in the hand of Germany’s central 
bank, the Reichsbank, and a bureaucracy was established to oversee compliance 
with the new regulations.2 Foreign exchange control offices, or Devisenstellen, 
were established under the joint control of the Treasury, or 
Reichsfinanzministerium, and the Economics Ministry, or Reichswirtschaftsmini-
sterium. While the Reichsbank monopolized foreign exchange transactions and the 
Treasury provided administrative support through the Devisenstellen, the 
Economics Ministry defined policy. Foreign exchange and foreign assets had to be 
declared to the Devisenstellen and were to be offered to the Reichsbank on demand. 
Violations were subject to draconian fines up to the confiscation of all the 
defendant’s assets.3 This latter provision would open a gateway for arbitrary 
expropriation of emigrating Jews from 1933 on. Beginning in 1934, a migrant’s 
remaining assets would be credited to a blocked domestic currency account at the 
currency conversion exchange, or Konversionskasse, an operation of the 
Reichsbank, and only a fraction would be converted into foreign exchange (see e.g. 
Drecoll, 2011). 
 
Application of these instruments was uneven at first. In the city state of Hamburg, 
the Devisenstellen early on treated emigrating Jews as suspicious of capital flight, 
see Bajohr, (2001). This created a pathway to sequestering and confiscating their 
assets above and beyond the emigration tax itself. The Hamburg example was 
quickly though not universally adopted elsewhere. Its originator, young economist 
Gustav Schlotterer, was promoted to the RWM in Berlin in 1935, and his system 
was adopted nationwide in 1936.4  In the same year, a central coordinating body 
for the Devisenstellen was established at the RWM, being tasked with unifying 
                                                          
2 A presidential emergency decree of July 15, 1931, had given the government powers to impose 
foreign exchange control, RGBl I (1931), p. 365. An executive order form the same day 
established the foreign exchange monopoly, RGBl 1 (1931), p. 366. Under Art. 10, all assets of the 
defendant could be confiscated if needed to ensure payment of the fines or the confiscation of the 
foreign exchange in question. These provisions were reaffirmed in a presidential emergency 
decree of August 1, 1931, RGBl 1 (1931), p. 423, which also established the Devisenstellen. 
3 Gesetz gegen Verrat der deutschen Volkswirtschaft, June 12, 1933, RGBl I (1933), p. 360. 
4 Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die Devisenbewirtschaftung, December 1, 1936, Art 37a, 
BGBl I (1936), p. 1000.  
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policy and maximizing the extraction of convertible foreign exchange and other 
assets from emigrating Jews.  
 
Konversionskasse data on foreign exchange released for transfers of assets abroad 
(including also foreign debt service, which Germany partly defaulted on in 1933) 
suggest a steep decline in the percentages transferred into foreign exchange 
during the mid-1930s Deutsche Bundesbank (1976), see also Table 7 below). As 
much as 80% of overall claims against Konversionskasse were still transferred in 
1934, while only 10% were released in 1938. This seems broadly consistent with 
the archival evidence from regional studies on Jewish emigration: while in most 
places, it was still generally possible to get assets out of Germany in 1933 and 
1934, conditions worsened significantly and irreversibly from 1935 on.     
 
b) Taxation of emigration  
Before a migrant could hope to transfer any remaining wealth abroad, substantial 
taxes were due. Along with capital controls, a 25% wealth tax on emigration had 
already been introduced in 1931. Intended as a tax on capital flight after the 
financial crisis of the same year, it initially only affected wealth beyond sizeable 
thresholds. In 1933, sharp downward revisions of these thresholds came into force, 
implying that the tax now also fell on middle class migrants.  Revenues from this 
tax increased gradually until 1937, followed by a sharp upward spike in 1938. On 
a first reading, this might suggest that tax revenues from outmigration and grew 
only slowly. This would be misleading: between 1933 and 1937, revenues from this 
tax had already increased more than fourfold (see Table 7 below). The new spike 
in 1938 was driven by Germany’s annexation of Austria in March, as well as by 
the Kristallnacht pogrom in November. Still, in 1938 and 1939 together, tax 
revenue was twice that of the preceding years combined. This is not necessary a 
reflection of the temporal pattern of migration itself, as those with larger asset 
bases in Germany may have held out longer. Little is known about this and further 
research is needed. It certainly reflects the steep rise in financial pressure and 
persecution that set in with the occupation of Austria and reached a first peak in 
the November pogrom.  
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c) Capital levy 
Plans for a confiscatory capital levy were considered already in 1936 as part of the 
Four Years Plan but then shelved, possibly for fear of international retaliation, 
see e.g. Barkai (1989). An executive order issued in April of 1938 forced all Jews 
to declare their assets exceeding a 5000 RM threshold. Days after the 
Kristallnacht pogrom, another such order imposed a levy on Germany’s Jews. A 
further order issued by the RFM specified the levy to be 20% of all assets declared 
under the earlier order of April, to be paid in four instalments. It also stated a 
revenue target of 1bn RM, and threatened further payments should that target 
not be reached. An additional instalment was indeed imposed in October, 1939, 
several weeks into Germany’s attack on Poland. In the end, Germany’s Jews paid 
a capital levy on a 25% tax schedule, and the proceeds were slightly higher than 
1.2 bn RM. Regional data indicate, however, that only a low share of the Jewish 
population was subject to the levy. For the city of Hamburg, Aly (2007) documents 
a percentage as low as 15%. In other places where confiscation prior to 1938 had 
perhaps been somewhat less aggressive, these shares may have been somewhat 
higher. This gives rise to the more fundamental question of why the proceeds of 
the levy were so low, what the wealth level of Germany’s Jews in the 1930s was, 
and how it compares to average wealth in the German population. 
 
 
III. The quantitative impact 
The considerable political attention given by the Nazis to Jewish dispossession 
and the substantial bureaucratic effort made could suggest that the gains were 
indeed high, inviting economic interpretations of financial destruction and 
ultimately of the Holocaust.  But such automatic conclusions could be premature 
and need to be checked against the data. Germany kept only scattered accounts of 
the fiscal revenue accruing to central government from Jewish dispossession. An 
office of former finance ministry bureaucrats run by the Allied military 
governments in the post-war period provided compilations and aggregated figures. 
The German-language report on “Measures against the Jewish Population and Its 
Institutions Since 1933”, dated from 1947, first discussed the executive orders 
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based on the Nuremberg laws and their effect. It then went on to document their 
fiscal impact, in part relying on the authors’ expert knowledge of the Reichs’s 
classified World War II budgets for the data.5 
 
The strategy of that report was to set out from the census and registration of 
Jewish assets in April 1938. It gave the net value of Jewish assets thus registered 
as roughly 4.5 bn RM (see the next section for a discussion).  It then proceeded to 
examine the extent to which taxation and confiscation after that date had 
syphoned this wealth off into the coffers of the Reich. Revenue was listed 
separately for the major categories of fiscal dispossession.  
 
a)  Capital levy 
Judenvermögensabgabe, the levy imposed on Germany’s Jewish population after 
the November 1938 pogrom, applied the definitions and thresholds of the asset 
registration from the same year.6 Levied while the tax offices were still working 
extra hours to complete the statistics on Jewish assets, it purported to raise 1 bn 
RM from a 20% wealth tax that was payable in four instalments, or to raise the 
percentage to meet that goal. When it became clear that revenues from the 20% 
capital levy would result in a shortfall, the rate was increased to 25%.7 Total 
revenue by years from Germany (excluding Austria and other annexations) is 
listed in Table 1. Assuming the 25% tax rate was uniformly applied, the 
underlying wealth subjected to the levy stood at 4.506 bn RM. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 German Federal Archivs R2 Anh. 81/4, 82.  
6 Verordnung über eine Sühneleistung der Juden deutscher Staatsangehörigkeit of November 
12,1938, RGBl I (1938), p. 1579. 
7 Zweite Durchführungsverordnung über die Sühneleistung der Juden of October 19, 1939, RGBl I 
(1939), p. 2059. 
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b)  Confiscations based on the decrees of 24 Nov and 3 Dec 1938 
Under the first, less well-known decree, the RWM received powers to confiscate 
Jewish property for the sake of further war preparation.8 The second decree, 
issued by RWM ten days later allowed Jewish businesses to be confiscated at will. 
Moreover, Jews were forced to sell hand-picked assets at knock-down prices, had 
other assets frozen and transferred to a foreign exchange bank for the purpose of 
selling them abroad. Revenues from this sales operation were again hidden in a 
generic position in the Reich’s budgets for 1938 to 1940. The report lists them as 
follows: 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
c)  Confiscations based on the 11th executive order of November 1941 
Financial destruction of Germany’s Jews was near-completed when the big waves 
of deportations set in. The 11th executive order to the Nuremberg race laws 
stripped all Jewish emigrés of their citizenship and confiscated their wealth. An 
ominous clause in the same act extended this to all Jews leaving Germany in the 
future.9 The report’s list of proceeds from confiscated assets is reproduced in Table 
3.  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Combining the evidence in Tables 2 and 3, total Jewish wealth had declined to 
0.83 bn RM in late 1941, of which 312 mill RM were registered as confiscated in 
1942 and 348 mill RM in 1943. The 1944 value of 165 mill RM is a budgeted figure; 
the actual numbers are unknown. In all likelihood the temporal pattern does not 
reflect the pace of actual confiscations but rather the inertia of feeding the 
numbers through the state bureaucracy.  
 
                                                          
8 Zweite Anordnung auf Grund der Verordnung über die Anmeldung des Vermögens von Juden of 
November 24, 1938, RGBl I (1938), p. 1668. 
9 Elfte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz of November 25, 1941, RGBl I (1941), p. 722. 
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d)  The Reichsvereinigung’s assets 
As discussed in the previous section, the assets of Jewish organisations and 
charities had been pooled in the Reichsvereinigung, which used them largely for 
welfare purposes, an ever more urgent task given the increasing destitution of the 
Jewish population. One onerous financial burden was the contribution to 
Theresienstadt, which took the form of both direct subsidies and the notorious 
Heimeinkaufsverträge, contracts signed with unsuspecting elderly people who 
were made to believe they could buy themselves a safe place in an old age home 
there. An even more destructive task was implicit the Reichsvereinigung’s plea for 
cash donations from deportees. All deportees were supposed to hand over 25% of 
their remaining cash to the Reichsvereinigung, ostensibly to pay for their 
sustenance during the journey. The report from 1947 continues: “There is no doubt 
that also the cost of the transports and other cost in connection with the 
deportation were financed from these donations, although the Staatspolizei offices 
were not authorised to access these donated funds.” 
 
Whatever was left of the Reichsvereinigung’s assets was summed up in the report 
as reproduced in Table 4. 
 
(Table 4 about here) 
 
The document adds these figures up in two different ways. One is the simple grand 
total of Tables 1-4 above. The second includes confiscations and dispossession by 
the German states since 1933, roughly estimated at 1 mill RM. The source adds 
that further research on this would be needed: the 1 mill RM figure clearly has the 
role of a placeholder and is arguably too low. Excluding it for the moment, to be 
added back in later, the grand total of fiscal dispossession from 1938 to 1944 
surveyed in the 1949 source is given in Table 5. 
 
(Table 5 about here) 
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The figures in Table 5 are incomplete in several ways. They do not include 150 
mill RM in cash and the 1800-2000 pieces of real estate, which the report listed 
separately. They also do not include the contributions to the Reichsvereinigung or 
any assets, cash, and gold robbed during deportation. Perhaps more importantly, 
they exclude all revenues from the Reich’s emigration tax, as well as other forms 
of dispossession before 1938. 
 
d) Reich’s flight tax 
Between 1933 and 1945, total revenue from the Reich’s flight tax, the levy on 
emigration, was 941 mill RM. Of these, 689 mill RM accrued from April 1938, the 
date of the Jewish wealth survey. Adding these to the total in table 5 would still 
give an incomplete account of the confiscation of Jewish wealth: from 1938 to 1941, 
the underlying capital was not necessarily confiscated but not transferred abroad 
either, except perhaps for trivial amounts. From 1941 on, all remaining capital 
was confiscated either retroactively or upon deportation. Table 6 provides a 
corrected estimate of fiscal dispossession from 1938 to 1945. 
 
(Table 6 about here) 
 
Entry (A) in Table 6 carries over from the previous Table. Adding the proceeds 
from Reichsfluchtsteuer gives (B), the tax revenue generated for the German state 
from directly dispossessing Jews in Germany since 1938. To this needs to be added 
150 mill RM of cash left behind by the Reichsvereinigung (C), as well as the 
aforementioned 1800-2000 plots of real estate. Adding up these items leads to an 
estimate of total Jewish wealth dispossessed from 1938 to 1945 (D). This figure 
stands at 4.8 bn RM, 300 mill. RM above the estimate implied in the yield of the 
1938 capital levy (Table 1 above).  The discrepancy is due to possible double 
counting, inaccuracies in the confiscation estimates for 1944, or the 5000 RM 
threshold in the 1938 wealth survey.  
 
Of the 4.5 bn RM of wealth in 1938 that are implicit in the yields of the 25% capital 
levy, fiscal dispossession of Germany’s Jews brought 2.7 bn RM, (B) in Table 6, 
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into the hands of the German state. This would leave a 1.8 bn RM shortfall. 
Revenues from the Reich flight tax of 689 mill RM implies a capital of 2.757 bn 
RM, or 2.068 bn RM after tax, which by far exceeds the confiscations under the 
11th decree recorded in Table 3.  Unless we assume that all assets belonged to 
migrants and the trapped Jewish population remaining behind was penniless, this 
implies substantial losses upon liquidation of Jewish assets. The resulting gains 
accrued to private buyers, not the state – which only enforced taxation at market 
values but not necessarily the asset sale. The added items from Reichsvereinigung 
added to (C) and (D) in Table 6 correct this impression somewhat but do not alter 
the result substantially. All things considered, confiscatory taxation of Germany’s 
Jews from 1938 on yielded perhaps two thirds, at the maximum 70% of registered 
Jewish assets. The rest remains unaccounted for. Parts were surely consumed by 
the owners or handed over to the Reichsvereinigung for poor relief. The remainder 
must have been appropriated by German buyers in transactions far below market 
value.  
 
e) Fiscal dispossession before 1938 
Much less information is available on fiscal dispossession before 1938. While there 
is ample narrative evidence on dispossession by individual Germans, no specially 
designed confiscatory taxes except for Reichsfluchtsteuer existed before 1938. As a 
consequence, the only quantitative evidence to be relied on is again the migration 
tax, or Reichsfluchtsteuer itself, the closest to a levy on Jews before 1938. Yields 
from Reichsfluchtsteuer for 1933 to 1937 permit an upper-bound estimate of the 
capital losses to emigrating Jews.  
 
(Table 7 about here)  
 
Table 7 exploits the information implicit in the data on Reichsfluchtsteuer and in 
the transfer quota into foreign exchange. As discussed above, revenue from the 
emigration tax rose steadily before 1938 already. Applying the 25% tax rate yields 
the tax base, the migrants’ assets. Whether or not these could be used would 
depend on the transfer quota, the ratio at which foreign exchange was allocated to 
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domestic claims. This ratio fell drastically as capital controls tightened, from 80% 
in 1934 to 10% in 1937. As a consequence, emigration became confiscatory: the 
25% emigrant tax combined with a 10% transfer quota implied a 92.5% tax rate – 
always assuming that Jewish migrants were not discriminated against in the 
allocation of scarce foreign exchange, an assumption which is clearly unjustified. 
Fiscal dispossession according to Table 7 thus took two forms. One was 
Reichsfluchtsteuer, the emigration tax itself. Prior to 1938, it yielded .25 bn RM. 
The other was the blockage of transfers abroad. Until and including 1937, this 
yielded another .5 bn RM. This second instrument was thus fiscally more effective 
than the first. Both measures together implied that on average, migrants during 
1933-1937 had to leave behind over three quarters of their assets. This is 
substantially higher than the 66-70% fiscal yield from dispossession calculated 
above for the resident Jewish population from 1938 on. The strong implicit 
disincentive to emigrate implicit in Table 7 combined with near-prohibitive 
bureaucratic obstacles to keep emigration rates until 1937 relatively low. The 
sharp rise in discrimination and dispossession in 1938 appears to have partly 
mitigated this incentive effect. However, as if to intentionally thwart the official 
policy of fostering Jewish emigration, the administration cut the foreign exchange 
allocations for prospective migrants to near zero in late 1938, effectively trapping 
many of those who were willing to get out in the last minute.  
 
 
IV. Estimating Jewish wealth  
The above results permit a first approximation to estimating Jewish wealth in the 
1930s, however imprecise in detail. Combining the yields form the capital levy in 
1938 and after with those from the emigration tax for the preceding years can 
provide a lower-bound estimate of Jewish wealth. It is a lower bound because both 
taxes applied only beyond a threshold, thus ignoring the plausibly large mass of 
Jews with only little wealth per capita. It also is a lower bound estimate because 
prior to 1938, the available tax data only permit estimating the wealth of 
migrants, while no such information is available for the resident population. More 
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precisely, while we do have an estimate of Jewish wealth in 1938, little is known 
about its evolution between 1933 and 1937, and we can only make inferences.  
 
A second source of information comes from rough estimates of Jewish wealth put 
together at various stages by the Reichsbank, Germany’s central bank at the time, 
and the Statistical Office. Given their large error margins, however, these 
estimates are only of limited use. If anything, the data produced above can be 
employed to decide between the various different estimates these agencies 
produced. Last, information can be drawn from other sources on the aggregate and 
per-capita wealth in the German economy in the 1930s, trying to see if the results 
from such an exercise differ vastly from those for the Jewish population. Table 8 
gives a synopsis of estimates of German Jewish wealth. 
 
(Table 8 about here) 
 
The upper panel of Table 8 replicates a collection of estimates put together by 
Fremdling (2016) in recent work on the Statistical Office during the Third Reich. 
The office was tasked in the mid-1930s with producing estimates of Jewish wealth, 
arguably with a view to later registration and expropriation. The sources found by 
Fremdling cite wildly diverging guesstimates launched in the German press at the 
time, reaching as high as 20 bn RM. Not all of this can be dismissed as mere 
propaganda: one estimate of 10-12 bn RM came from a well-informed magazine 
with competent economists on its staff.   
 
The Statistical Office produced three figures, dismissively characterising them as 
mere “vague guesses.” The first (Statistical Office I) was based on an extrapolation 
from a 1928 census of business to 1933. The extremely low values reflect the 
collapse in asset values during the recession after 1929, which had hit Germany 
as strongly as the U.S. The second estimate (Statistical Office II) builds on the 
first one but assumes that commercial asset values had recovered since 1933. Both 
estimates would be consistent with each other assuming that commercial asset 
values had dropped by 50% from 1928 to 1933 and subsequently recovered, which 
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would not seem unrealistic.  The estimates also make a correction for the loss of 
wealth due to forced sales and emigration, but argue that the general rise of asset 
value in the economic recovery since 1933 was a counteracting force. The third 
estimate of the Statistical Office discussed by Fremdling is no more than a 
summary statement in the source, stating in contradiction to the text in the same 
source that aggregate Jewish wealth might be estimated at 8.5 bn RM. An 
estimate from the Reichsbank from 1938 reflects the continuing uncertainty, 
allowing values in the range from 2.4 to 11.5 bn RM.  
 
While the estimates discussed so far all were based on forward extrapolations from 
1928 or 1933, the seminal work of Junz (2002) extrapolates backward from the 
1938 census of Jewish wealth. Dissecting the 1938 census results using data from 
Austria, Junz is able to extract figures for Germany proper and to partly reconcile 
the puzzling coexistence of very high and very low estimates, as evidenced e.g. in 
the Reichsbank figures. For Austria and Germany combined, Jewish gross wealth 
was registered at 8.531 bn RM. Net wealth after deduction of debts was 7.123 bn 
RM. For Germany proper, the respective figures were 6.236 bn RM and 5.081 bn 
RM. Deducting pension claims from the latter figure, Junz arrived at a net wealth 
estimate of 4.3 bn RM for Germany in 1938. This is slightly below the 4.5 bn RM 
implicit in the proceeds from the capital levy in the same year.  
 
Junz’ careful calculations again demonstrate the value of clarity about the 
concepts used: a figure of 4.3-4.5 bn RM (Jewish net wealth in Germany in early 
1938) is consistent with 8.5 bn RM (Jewish gross wealth in Germany and Austria 
in the same year), just the categories are different. The difference between gross 
and net wealth also offers a partial explanation for the discrepancies between the 
Statistical Office’s estimates in Table 6. 
 
Junz then extrapolates backwards from the 1938 net values to 1933, making 
assumptions about Jewish emigration and the loss of asset values due to forced 
sales below market value. This would yield 8 bn RM in net Jewish wealth in 1933. 
Likewise, working backwards from gross values in 1938 and making the same 
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assumptions, one would arrive at Jewish gross wealth of 11.6 bn RM in 1933. 
These backward extrapolations appear to go somewhat high, just as the estimates 
of the Statistical Office seem to be on the low side. An alternative backward 
extrapolation combining the capital levy and the emigration tax arrives at 5.5 bn 
RM (lower panel of Table 8), adding 1 bn RM of capital lost during emigration until 
March 1938 (column 2 of Table 7) to the April 1938 benchmark.  
 
Losses in asset values of Jewish property would present a threat to such 
valuations, as well as the backward extrapolations. One potential source of 
undervaluation is due to forced fire sales at depressed prices. A second source is 
the drop in asset values of firms identified as Jewish owned or Jewish managed 
even before transfer of ownership. Huber et al. (2018) find that stock prices of 
Jewish-managed joint stock companies underperformed the German market 
throughout the 1930s by about 10% on average, affecting Jewish- and non-Jewish-
owned firms alike. However, the valuation methods applied by German tax 
authorities for purposes of both the 1938 census and calculating the flight tax were 
based, not on actual sales values but on valuation standards for tax purposes 
introduced in 1934.10 The 5.5 bn RM obtained above would be calculated at these 
tax values and do not include assets losses incurred before 1938 by Jews staying 
in Germany. To the extent that valuation for tax purposes was nevertheless 
affected by losses in asset values, these figures are a minimum. At the same time, 
they impose a plausibility limit on the amount of wealth lost by the resident 
Jewish population before 1938: fiscal dispossession until 1938 was mostly geared 
towards taxing emigration.  
 
To be on the safe side, two possible corrections to the tax figure suggest 
themselves. One is to generalise the findings of Huber et al. (2018) and assume a 
                                                          
10 Verordnung über die Anmeldung des Vermögens von Juden of April 26, 1938, RGBl I (1938), p. 
414. Article 3 of this executive order signed by Goering stipulated that all assets were to be 
valued at “gemeiner Wert.” An earlier act on valuations for taxation purposes, 
Reichsbewertungsgesetz of October 16, 1934, RGBl I (1934), p. 1035, defined as “gemeiner Wert” 
the market price the asset would typically fetch under normal business conditions (ibid, Art. 10). 
Crucially, unusual conditions or personal circumstances were not to be considered. This 
definition and the basic tenets of the 1934 act still apply today. 
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10% undervaluation across the board. This would suggest a figure of 6.1 bn RM.11 
The suggestion of the 1947 document mentioned above is instead to add 1 bn RM 
to account for such losses and arrive at 6.5 bn RM, which allows for an 
undervaluation of 15% in the tax values.12 Implicitly, this also assumes that the 
property losses incurred by the resident Jewish population before 1938 were as 
big as the capital of the emigrants. Given that until 1938, there was a lack of fiscal 
instruments to dispossess Jews who did not emigrate, this is not a small 
assumption.  
 
h)  Jewish wealth and national wealth – how much is much? 
Despite the uncertainty about the estimates in detail, we have sufficient 
information at hand to compare Jewish wealth to national wealth in Germany at 
the time. Fremdling (2016) compares the capital levy to total taxable wealth in 
Germany in 1928. A second, arguably more reliable yardstick for comparison is 
the real capital stock, the underlying physical wealth in the economy. The best 
estimate by Gehrig (1961) puts Germany’s real capital stock in 1936 at about 400 
bn RM in current prices. According to an economists’ rule of thumb, real capital 
should be about five times gross domestic product. GDP in 1936 was indeed around 
80 bn RM, Ritschl (2002). Table 9 summarises the evidence. 
 
(Table 9 about here) 
 
Figures in Table 9 correspond to different classifications. Again, direct 
comparisons are near-meaningless unless the proper categories are considered. 
Total taxable wealth according to German wealth tax statistics was 117 bn RM in 
1928. After subtracting double-counting of corporate wealth, about 100 bn RM 
remain. It should be noticed that this value is abnormally low. Gross domestic 
product in the same year was 86 bn RM, slightly higher than in 1936. What is 
more, real capital stock (which theoretically is a subcategory of national wealth) 
                                                          
11 We apply the correction 5.5bn RM = 0.9* 6.11 bn RM.  
12 That is, 5.5bn RM = .846*6.5bn RM. Junz’ higher estimate of 8bn RM would be consistent with 
a one-third undervaluation in the tax values of Jewish assets. 
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was higher than the official estimate of taxable wealth. Perhaps the best available 
data by Gehrig (1961) suggest a value of roughly 400 bn RM in 1936, slightly above 
the level for 1928. The widely used net capital stock estimate by Hoffmann (1965) 
is at a slightly lower 338 bn RM in the same year.13 Several factors contribute to 
this anomaly. One was the near-destruction of nominal assets in the German 
hyperinflation before 1924. Other factors were an undervaluation of assets in the 
opening balance sheets of 1924, a generous system of exemptions, and widespread 
tax avoidance that depressed the amount of taxable wealth to unrealistically low 
levels.  
 
As a consequence, conflicting stories can be told about the significance of Jewish 
wealth in the overall economy. Calculating the highest estimates of Jewish gross 
wealth into the taxable wealth data, Jews would be seen as having owned upwards 
of 10% of national wealth. If Junz’ (2002) speculative estimate of 16 bn RM of 
Jewish wealth in 1933 was right, the Jewish share would easily rise to 20% of 
national wealth in 1933 (assuming that aggregate wealth levels in that year were 
significantly lower than in 1928). Even the wealth estimate we obtained from the 
tax data would still put Jewish wealth at 6.5% of total 1928 wealth, or even higher 
in 1933. The image of a fabulously rich community would emerge, one whose share 
in national wealth was several times higher than its population share. There is 
little doubt that the Nazis themselves believed in such things. Yet this evidence is 
shaky. 
 
Calculating Jewish wealth into real capital presents itself as an alternative. For 
it must be assumed that the coverage of Jewish wealth implicit in the emigration 
tax and the capital levy was more comprehensive and more strictly enforced than 
the wealth tax for the general population. A safer alternative is therefore to focus 
on real assets, i.e. land, buildings and business equipment, which enter into the 
calculation of the real capital stock and are less subject to underreporting and 
undervaluation than other asset classes, especially given the aforementioned 
                                                          
13 Assuming 5% depreciation of gross capital to arrive at net capital, the discrepancy between 
both estimates is 12%. 
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valuation rules from 1934. Junz (2002) provides a breakdown of net Jewish wealth 
in 1938 by categories, with 54% being real capital. Applying this percentage to the 
5.5 bn RM estimate of Jewish wealth in Table 9 above, an estimated 2.99 bn RM 
of Jewish-owned real capital is obtained. Calculating this into the total (400 bn 
RM) yields a Jewish share of .75% of German real capital, which is almost exactly 
in line with the Jewish population share of .77% in 1933.  
 
The proper comparison should perhaps be with real capital in the private sector, 
not with aggregate real capital which also includes the public sector. Table 10 
therefore calculates various estimates of Jewish-owned real capital stock into two 
different estimates of real private capital stock. Estimate A is obtained from the 
tax data estimate of Jewish wealth in Table 8, excluding the estimated other forms 
of dispossession during 1933-1937. Estimate B, which to us seems most plausible, 
includes this item. Estimate C is obtained from Junz’ (2002) estimate of Jewish 
wealth and is also in line with highest of the wealth estimates by the Statistical 
Office. Two estimates I and II of private real capital in 1937 come from Hoffmann 
(1965) and Gehrig (1961). Between them, these estimates generate shares of 
Jewish wealth in privately owned capital stock in Germany that range from .96% 
to 1.57%. By comparison, the Jewish population share in 1933 was .77%. On 
average, the Jewish population was somewhat but not substantially more wealthy 
than the non-Jewish population. As the estimates of the Statistical Office reported 
in Fremdling (2016) bear out, this may partly be due to Jewish 
underrepresentation among blue collar workers and domestic servants, where 
land ownership was minimal. Further research would be required to shed light on 
this.  
 
 
V. Conclusions and Implications 
Germany in the 1930s taxed its Jewish minority out of existence. This paper 
reviewed facts and figures on the quantitative impact of confiscatory taxation 
beginning in 1933, using statistical material produced right after World War II for 
the Allied occupation authorities. Until early 1938, taxation and confiscation were 
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systematically directed against Jews emigrating or willing to emigrate, leading to 
progressively stronger dispossession and making emigration increasingly more 
difficult if not outright impossible. Fiscal dispossession of the resident Jewish 
population was briefly considered already in 1936 but then postponed to early 
1938 after the annexation of Austria. The available data suggest that of the wealth 
registered in 1938 for confiscation, hardly more than half was accounted for as 
actually confiscated. The rest must have been consumed or – less likely so due to 
draconian administrative control – siphoned off by private profiteers without 
arriving to the state coffers as intended.  
 
The data also permit re-estimating Jewish wealth, building on the work of Junz 
(2002). We find that total Jewish wealth was plausibly in the middle of a range of 
back-of-the-envelope estimates produced by Statistisches Reichsamt, Germany’s 
statistical office, in 1936 and reported by Fremdling (2016), but lower than the 
estimates suggested by Junz. Jewish wealth and capital was quite well in line with 
the Jewish population share, perhaps below one percent of Germany’s real capital 
stock but certainly less than twice that. This should lay to rest any notion of 
fabulous Jewish riches that the Nazis were able to exploit. Dispossession was 
extreme and complete. But the spoils were apparently marginal.  
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Table 1: Proceeds from 1938 capital levy (mill. RM) 
1938 498.515 
1939 533.127 
1940 94.971 
Total 1,126.612 
  
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4. 
 
 
Table 2:  Proceeds from confiscations under the 1938 RWM decree (mill. RM) 
  
1938 5.483 
1942 34.530 
1943 9.156 
1944 5.000 
Total 54.170 
  
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4. 
 
 
Table 3: Proceeds from confiscations under the 11th 
executive order of 1941 (mill. RM) 
a)  Financial assets 
  
1942 56.798 
1943 69.315 
1944 60.000 
Total 186.114 
  
 
b) All other assets 
  
1942 221.649 
1943 269.963 
1944 100.000 
Total 591.612 
  
1942-3:  Actual revenue 
1944:   Budgeted  
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4. 
 
Table 4: Remaining Reichsvereinigung assets, 1947 
Cash        150 mill RM 
Plots of real estate (number) 1800-2000 
  
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4. 
 
 
Table 5: Fiscal dispossession 1938-44 (raw data), mill RM 
Capital levy 1,126.612 
Confiscations under decree of Nov 1938 54.170 
Confiscations under 11th executive order 
of Nov 1941 777.726 
Total 1,958.508 
  
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4. 
 
 
Table 6: Fiscal dispossession 1938-44 (corrected), mill RM 
A. Total items Table 5 1,958.508 
 Reichsfluchtsteuer revenue 689.362 
B. Total taxed away 2,647,870 
 Cash left over at 
Reichsvereinigung 150.000 
C. Total cash 2,797.870 
 1800-2000 plots of real estate left 
 over at Reichsvereinigung 
 
180-360.000? 
D. Fiscal dispossession 1938-44 total 3-3,200.000? 
Revenue from Reichsfluchtsteuer is for fiscal years from 1 
April 1938 to 31 March 1945 
German Federal Archives, R2 Anh 81/4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7: Fiscal dispossession of migrants, 1933/34-1937/38, mill RM  
 Emigration 
tax 
revenue 
Implied 
capital 
Estimated 
transfer 
quota 
Taxed/ 
Immobilized 
Implicit 
emigration 
tax rate 
For 
comparison: 
Bajohr 
(2003) 
1933 17.602 70.408 50% 44.005 62.5% 20% 
1934 38.120 152.480 80% 60.992 40.0% 65% 
1935 45.337 181.348 35% 133.744 73.8%  
1936 69.911 279.644 19% 239.795 85.8% 81% 
1937 81.354 325.416 10% 301.010 92.5% *90% 
Total 252.324 1009.296 30% 779.546 77.2%  
  
Revenue from Reichsfluchtsteuer is for fiscal years from 1 April 1933 
to 31 March 1938 
German Federal Archives R2 Anh 81/4, Bundesbank (1976), Bajohr 
(2003, p. 21), author’s own calculations.  
* June 1938. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Estimates of Jewish net wealth, mid-1930s, bn RM 
Press reports  10-20 
Statistical Office I (1933)          2-2.5 
Statistical Office II (1936)          4-4.5 
Statistical Office III 8.5 
Reichsbank (1938) 2.4-11.5 
Junz (2002)  (1933)     8.0-16.0 
 (1938)             4.3 
Tax data (ca 1936)  5.5-6.5 
 of which: 
 from 1938/39 capital levy 
 from 1933-37 emigration tax 
Other 
 from other 1933-1937 
dispossession 
 
4.5 
1.0  
 
 
(1.0) 
Upper panel:  Fremdling (2015), Junz (2002) 
Lower panel:  Table 5 (capital levy) 
  Table 7 (emigration tax, implied capital) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Jewish and national wealth, bn RM 
  
 
Taxable wealth (1928) 
 Fremdling (2016) 100 
 
Real capital stock (1937)  
 Gehrig (1961)* 400 
  
Jewish wealth  
 Junz (2002)    
(1933)         8-16 
   (1938)           4.3 
 Tax data (ca 1936)       5.5-6.5 
  
 
 
Table 10: Real capital stock and the Jewish population share (bn RM) 
Real capital in the private sector, 1937  
 
I II  
 312.6 278.2  
 of which: Jewish owned, dispossessed 1933-39   
Estimate Total (bn RM) Share of I Share of II  
A 2.99 0.96 % 1.08 % 
 
 B 3.54 1.13 % 1.27 % 
C 4.36 1.39 % 1.57 % 
For comparison:   
  
Jewish population share 1933 0.77 %   
Real capital: I: Gehrig (1961, p. 56, p. 35), II: Hoffmann (1965, p. 256). 
Estimates A-C: own calculations using share of real capital in 1938 
census of Jewish wealth, Junz (2002, p. 79) and BAB R3102/4740, 
applied to alternative total wealth estimates (A) 5.5 bn RM , (B) 6.5 bn 
RM, and (C) 8bn RM. See also Fremdling (2016). 
Jewish population share 1933: Junz (2002). 
 
